The MAA does not want a folder of reports. It wants an argument that this air system is acceptably safe, and the evidence underneath it. CertProve builds both from your programme
What this regime costs you today
Each Regulatory Article is reissued on its own clock. Cite one without its issue and you are quoting text that has moved.
The regulation moves under you
Every Regulatory Article is reissued on its own timetable. Your last submission may already quote text that has changed.
A folder is not a case
Reports prove things. Somebody still has to argue why the whole air system is acceptably safe, and defend it.
The hazard log outlives the team
It is read years later by people who were not in the room when the risk was accepted.
Two authorities, one aircraft
The design side recommends and the TAA releases. Each wants a different document, built from the same truth.
Whatever you fly, it has to be proven
The MRP reaches every UK military air system, and what it carries
Combat air
Air transport
Air to air refuelling
Airborne surveillance
Attack helicopter
Maritime helicopter
Support helicopter
Remotely piloted
Small uncrewed
Weapons and stores
What changes when the evidence derives itself
Citing what is in force
todayan article number copied from the last submission
hereevery article named at the issue it is on, read from the file the MAA publishes
Making the argument
todaya folder of reports, and a narrative written last
herea structured safety argument, with an unsupported branch shown as unsupported
Keeping the hazard log
todayhazards, acceptances and names scattered across tools
hereeach hazard held with its acceptance and who accepted it, in one record
Producing both documents
todaythe certificate of design and the recommendation assembled twice
hereboth derive from one set of evidence, so they cannot disagree
What we stand on, and what we will never do
we stand on
MRP Part 21every subpart, with the MAA article named beside it
The article for each subpartread at the issue in force from the page the MAA publishes it on
Design safety targets and cyberthe articles that set what acceptably safe has to mean for your type
Your own programmethe certificate of design and the recommendation derive from your data, not a template
we will never
noRelease anythingthe TAA releases. We build the recommendation and sign nothing.
noQuote what we cannot readDef Stan 00-970 sits behind a login, so no basis is proposed from it.
noCite an article looselyan article without its issue is refused outright, because nobody can tell what was read.
noMove your datasingle tenant inside your own boundary, markings on every export.
Check us on itPick an air system and read every record this composes, set-asides and all
Bring a change you have already been through
Bring a change you have already been through. Six weeks, against the articles your project is regulated by, at the issues in force
your own baselinesix weeksevery article at its issueyou keep the report either way
No held specification. The UK military airworthiness code is Def Stan 00-970, published behind the DStan login, so the product proposes no basis from it and names it instead.
EMAR 21
01Certification Programme for a Military Type Certificatethe EDA record stands in
02Military Type Certificate Application and Holder Filethe EDA record stands in
MAA Regulatory Publications
01Certificate of Design
02Air System Safety Case Report
03Type Airworthiness Safety Assessment Report
04Hazard Log
05Cyber Security for Airworthiness Assessment Record
