Wartime iteration, peacetime assurance
Fast jets, transports, helicopters, drones and the stores they carry. They change in weeks now. The approval processes behind them were built for a purchase once a decade
Anything that flies, and everything it carries
The first question a programme office asks is whether we cover the thing they build. This is the answer, drawn
Crewed air
People aboard, so the escape, the egress and the crew station are part of the showing
- Fast jetFlight envelope, stores clearance and the escape system
- BomberLong range structures, bays and release
- TransportCargo restraint, airdrop and the ramp
- TankerTwo aircraft in one showing, boom or drogue
- Maritime patrolMission fit, endurance and the sensor bay
- Airborne early warningA rotodome changes the aeroplane it sits on
- TrainerSpin, recovery and the seat a student sits in
Rotary wing
Rotor, drive and gearbox, and a crash volume that has to hold
- Attack helicopterStub wing stores, ballistic tolerance, low level
- Lift helicopterUnderslung load, hoist and troop egress
- Maritime helicopterDeck limits, folding rotor and the ship airwake
- TiltrotorTwo flight regimes and the conversion between them
Uncrewed
Nobody aboard, so the command link, the lost link and the control station are inside the showing
- Long enduranceAirspace access, link latency and return to base
- Collaborative combatAutonomy, teaming and a contingent flight path
- Rotary uncrewedShipborne recovery and an autonomous landing
- Small multirotorWhat is proportionate, and what is not
- Target and expendableRecovered by parachute, or not recovered
What they carry
Carriage, release and separation are the aircraft’s showing. What the weapon does after it leaves the rail belongs to another authority, and we do not go there
- Air to air missileRail or eject launch, plume and separation
- Cruise missileHeavy store carriage and clean release
- Precision guided bombBay or pylon, arming and jettison
- Loitering munitionTube or rail, and a store that flies itself
- Hypersonic vehicleThermal, structural and separation at speed
- Ballistic vehicleAir launched stages, mass and centre of gravity
Three regimes, three different answers
What lands on the authority desk depends on who regulates you. So each regime has a page of its own
Check us on itPick what you fly and who regulates you, and read every record the product composes
The threat moves, so the aircraft has to
Six steps, and the last one is the reason this page exists
The jamming works
The aircraft can no longer find its way to the target, or the target has been hardened against it
So the payload changes
A new sensor, a new datalink, a different way of being guided to the same place
So the platform iterates
In weeks. The industry planned for spirals measured in years
But the evidence was built once
The safety case assumed the aircraft would be bought and kept, not revised every quarter
And now the software thinks
Autonomy and model updates sit in the loop, changing between releases
So the assessment has to fit the cycle
The next revision arrives before the last safety case is closed, and the old process assumes the aircraft holds still while the evidence is assembled
AI hallucinates, and in a military aircraft that is fatal
Autonomy is entering the loop faster than the assurance behind it. A tool that fills a gap with a fluent guess moves the risk somewhere nobody is looking
CertProve abstains. Where the evidence does not support a claim, it says so and names what is missing. Every statement carries its source, and nothing is asserted because it sounded right
You do not have to trust our AI, bring your own or none at all
Four settings, and a programme can sit on any of them. The engines are deterministic code, so the product works completely with the model turned off
“Assisted drafting runs only on your organisation's own key and endpoint (BYOK), because the fact pack leaves the deployment. Configure the AI profile in Settings, or draft by hand.”
Every flying object that requires certification
The engines that grade a civil case against CS-25 grade a military UAV against STANAG 4671, cited to the clause or honestly abstaining, never invented
The Alliance wants drones at scale
An official text of 7 July 2026 says so in four points. Three of them are our subject. The fourth is not, and the page says which
The regulatory ground
Four regimes write the same duty four ways. A military record is cited to the point, the article, the criterion or the task it answers to, so a reader can open what the record stands on
The certification of military aircraft, their products, parts and appliances, and the organisations that design and produce them.
The United Kingdom transposes the requirements as Regulatory Articles, and a record names the article and the issue it read.
The airworthiness requirements for unmanned aircraft systems, named as a basis and never reproduced.
The airworthiness certification criteria and the system safety standard, both works of the United States Government in the public domain.
CertProve is independent: not endorsed by, affiliated with or funded by any body named here. Their rules are cited as published, and no emblem of theirs appears in the product
Three things, done properly
A new payload should cost an afternoon
Declare the change against the approved baseline, and the platform computes the certification impact instead of a team rediscovering it
Where certification is a requirement, and where it is not
Two of these three are ours. Naming the third is the honest part
What your security review will ask, answered by the machine
Their checklist on the left, our live readout on the right. Every row is a shipped behaviour with a test that fails the build the day it stops being true
Said plainly: the first deployments carry unclassified and non export controlled evidence, on an architecture built for the more sensitive tiers that follow
Build the evidence once, reuse it across allies
Two worlds, one refusal apart
The separation is not a promise in a contract, it is a behaviour of the machine you can test
“Defence programmes run on dedicated CertProve Defence deployments, never on this commercial one - by design, so no defence data can exist here.”
Evidence management, never approval
What it does is narrower and harder: it keeps the certification evidence connected, cited and honest, continuously.