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Specialised workflows on one foundation

Every technical team designs, analyses and verifies in depth, on the same living model, under aerospace-grade access control

Ten disciplines, station by station

Each discipline gets its own area, locked by default, contributing to one whole, the integration nobody else has

SYS01 / 10

Systems engineering

Functions, architecture and budgets on the model every other discipline derives from

PWR02 / 10

Powertrain

Electric, hydrogen fuel-cell, hybrid and distributed-electric packs, each with failure physics and clauses

AVI03 / 10

Avionics

The aircraft systems from ATA 21 to 57, hazards derived from components and connections

STR04 / 10

Structures

Fuselage, doors, windows, pylon and empennage on the same connected graph

SW05 / 10

Software · DO-178C

Software items tracing to the requirement they implement, at the DAL the requirement demands

HW06 / 10

Hardware · DO-254

Complex hardware with DAL flow-down checked against ARP4754B, assurance never silently reduced

SAFE07 / 10

Safety

The full ARP4761A chain, FHA to SSA, graded against the 25.1309 ceiling

V&V08 / 10

Verification & flight test

Ground and flight campaigns, every run tracing back to the requirement it closes

CERT09 / 10

Certification & review

The basis, means of compliance and the authority review, in place, not over email

QA10 / 10

Quality & configuration

NCR, FRACAS, change and problem records, linked to the artefacts they act on

Specialist depth, shared structure

A powertrain engineer never edits a stress case, yet both work the same aircraft, and the model carries each result to everyone downstream

Every discipline in the same window

Systems, hardware and safety working the same artefacts at the same moment, every edit attributed, nothing merged later

CERTPROVE / AV-01 / OVERVIEW
Find anything⌘K
SMD
LIVE
Model
Overview
Requirements
Architecture
Prove
Trace
Lattice
Gaps
Safety
FHA
FTA
Margins
Deliver
Test
Docs
Evidence
Work
Engineering lead

Overview

SystemsHardwareSoftwareSafetyTest
Systems model
SYS-REQ-104
Primary flight control actuation shall have triple redundant power
DAL AVERIFIED
SYS-REQ-105
Cross-tie contactor opens automatically on a bus short
DAL AFAILED
Alice (systems)
Hardware BOM
P/N 99-882-11
Actuator servo motor
P/N 99-882-14
Power distribution unit
Bob (hardware)
Safety
FHA-001CAT
Total loss of thrust on both motors
Sarah (safety)
REV CBASIS SC-VTOL214 NODES · 337 EDGES SYNCED

A change in one discipline ripples to every other

Because the graph is the structure

Not a maintained link

Bring your discipline onto the graph

Access is granted on request while the platform is in early release