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One living model carries the whole programme

Requirements, hazards, architecture, tests and evidence are one graph, graded against the live rule, from the first hazard to the sealed case

A link is not proof

Most requirements tools only confirm a link is there, CertProve checks whether it holds, so a broken, orphaned or unverified trace cannot hide behind a green tick

Only a passed test is evidence

A requirement with a failing or unrun test is not verified, however many links it carries

Trace runs both ways

A test that verifies nothing and a component nothing allocates to are gaps too, not clutter to ignore

A broken link is not a link

A trace pointing at an artefact that no longer exists is flagged as broken, never counted as healthy

Assurance cannot silently weaken

DAL flow-down is checked against ARP4754B, so implementation never carries less assurance than the hazard demands

The authority asks this first

A certification basis clause that no requirement cites is flagged before the review, not discovered in it

The whole aircraft, one model

Requirements, geometry, analysis and evidence resolve to a single connected model, not a folder of files that drift apart

Everything certification needs, already connected

From requirement to proof, one thread

A requirement, the components that implement it and the test that closes it, connected as structure. Pull any node and the whole chain answers.

CERTPROVE / AV-01 / TRACE
Find anything⌘K
SMD
LIVE
Model
Overview
Requirements
Architecture
Prove
Trace
Lattice
Gaps
Safety
FHA
FTA
Margins
Deliver
Test
Docs
Evidence
Work
Engineering lead

Trace

GraphImpactOrphansCoverage
TRACE QUERY
dal = A AND link = VERIFIED_BY
NODE TYPES
Requirement
Component
Test
SYS-RQ-441
Independent power
HW-PDU-01
Primary PDU
SW-BMC-C
Battery controller
TP-PDU-NOM
Nominal load
TR-8812
Passed, 10 Oct
REV CBASIS SC-VTOL214 NODES · 337 EDGES SYNCED

Derived from the model, graded against the rule

Six analyses in one linked flow, every verdict graded against the 25.1309 ceiling, catastrophic ≤ 1e-9

FHA

Functional Hazard Assessment

FMEA

Failure Modes & Effects

PSSA

Preliminary System Safety

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis

CCA

Common Cause Analysis

SSA

System Safety Assessment

You do not page through it, you fly it

STAGE

Fly the model

A spatial canvas with semantic zoom, pull back to the whole programme constellation, push in to a single requirement’s trace

HELM

Command by intent

Type what you want done and the cockpit navigates and acts, the fast path through a dense programme

CREW

A crew that cites or abstains

Every drafted row, requirement and gap arrives with its sources attached, and it refuses to invent a number

PULSE

A cockpit that breathes

Readiness recomputes live as evidence lands, and a briefing greets you with exactly what changed overnight

See the whole programme on one graph

Access is granted on request while the platform is in early release